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Abstract
This report describes the participatory facilitated workshop method and its use 
in nuclear emergency preparedness planning and management. The aim is to 
give guidance to responsible organizations on how to arrange such a workshop. 
The facilitated workshop is a group process that utilizes multi-criteria decision 
analysis to discuss the participants’ concerns and issues, and ultimately to decide 
on a course of action. The objectives are to achieve a mutual understanding of the 
issues at hand and a united commitment to the action to be implemented. The 
facilitated workshop method seems to fit well both in the beforehand planning 
of early protective actions and in the planning of countermeasures in the later 
phase of an accident. In beforehand planning, it can also be seen as an in-depth 
training method for the participating authorities.
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SINKKO Kari, AMMANN Michael, HÄMÄLÄINEN Raimo P., MUSTAJOKI Jyri. 
Säteilysuojelutoimenpiteiden suunnittelu päätösriihimenetelmällä ydinonnetto-
muuksien varalle. STUK-A226. Helsinki 2008, 41 s + liitteet 21 s.
Avainsanat: ydinonnettomuustilanteiden hallinta, suojaustoiminta, moniattri-
buuttipäätösanalyysi, sidosryhmien osallistuminen
Tiivistelmä
Tämä raportti esittelee päätösriihimenetelmän, jota voidaan käyttää ydinonnet-
tomuuksien hallinnassa ja niihin varautumisessa. Raportin tavoite on kertoa 
viranomaisille, miten päätösriihi parhaiten järjestetään ja mitä sen suunnitte-
lussa pitäisi ottaa huomioon. Päätösanalyysiteoriaan perustuva päätösriihimene-
telmä toimii hyvin, kun päätöksiä on valmistelemassa useita eri sidosryhmiä. Se 
on menetelmä, jonka avulla voidaan ottaa huomioon kaikkien päätöksentekoon 
osallistuvien sidosryhmien näkökohdat tasapuolisesti ja avoimesti. Se luo viite-
kehyksen, jonka avulla päätösongelmasta voidaan keskustella rakentavasti ja 
päätöksen taustoja viestittää muille. Näin ollen päätösriihi on höydyllinen mene-
telmä ydinonnettomuuksien hallinnassa ja erityisesti niihin varautumisessa. 
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1 Introduction
Justification and optimization of countermeasures are the basic principles in 
radiation protection as is emphasized by international organizations (ICRP 
to appear; OECD / NEA 2002). Countermeasures should be implemented so 
that more good is achieved than harm, and to maximize the net benefit. These 
organizations also advocate that the decision making process on countermeasures 
must be open and transparent to the public, and that all relevant attributes – 
both scientific facts and social factors – should be considered in a rational manner. 
They have also recognized the importance of national beforehand planning in 
order to take into account country and site-specific factors.
Openness, transparency and participation by all the relevant stakeholders 
are all important factors for a balanced and sustainable decision making on public 
issues (Renn et al. 1995; Susskind and Field 1996). Beierle and Cayford (2002) 
have argued that a managerial model, where the decision is made by authorities, 
does not suit environmental decision making problems, and that consensus-
based participation is needed to account for the public interest. In this respect, 
planning in advance is essential to identify all the relevant stakeholders and 
potential problems that may occur in a real accident situation. 
The stakeholders or interest groups are the key players that share the 
decision. These include national and local authorities, expert organizations, 
industry, producers and also the public. They can be engaged in the decision 
making process in various ways (see e.g. Mumpower 2001; Rowe and Frewer 
2005). Current practices range from those where interested parties are merely 
informed about the decision to those where the public makes the decision based 
on a recommendation (McDaniels et al. 1999). The most applicable citizen 
participation models include advisory committees, planning cells, citizen juries, 
consensus conferences, negotiated rulemaking, facilitated mediation and 
deliberative opinion polls (Renn et al. 1995; Beierle and Cayford 2002; Rowe 
and Frewer 2005). Participation should not, however, replace modern forms of 
representative democracy but it should be an integral part of the decision making 
process (Renn et al. 1995). 
Individual participation methods have different and apparent advantages 
but no single method is applicable in all situations. Some of the methods are also 
prone to shortcomings that have led to criticism (Gregory et al. 1993; McDaniels 
et al. 1999; Renn et al. 1995). For example, the decision might not be accountable 
or feasible, and long-term planning might be neglected if the participants are not 
responsible for the implementation of the decided actions. The focus might be 
in the public involvement itself, rather than being a means to the results (Rowe 
and Frewer 2000). The working procedures and efficiency in the use of time in 
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the group meetings can also be poor (Hämäläinen and Leikola 1995; Susskind 
and Field 1996). Communication can also be unstructured and the information 
not in the form needed in the decision making process. The reported experiences 
emphasize the importance of having relevant information, and clear procedures 
and methods for the decision making process (Sinkko et al. 2004). This need can 
be met with participatory methods that articulate the factors and judgments 
systematically and openly for all the people concerned.
This report describes the facilitated workshop method and how it can be 
applied in planning of protective actions in a case of a nuclear accident. It is 
a participatory approach which aims to include the concerns of all key players 
openly and equally in the decision. The approach employs a group process where 
responsibility is placed on the participants to assimilate information and to 
provide judgments. The main characteristic difference compared to other methods 
is that it has a clear structure based on decision analysis offering a scientific 
regime to assess intervention levels that are justified and optimized. 
Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) provides a suitable framework 
to deal with complex decision making problems with multiple attributes and 
alternatives (see e.g. Belton and Stewart 2002). Thus, it suits well the facilitated 
workshops. It helps to clarify the objectives (e.g. ‘avoid radiation-induced cancer 
cases’, ‘reassure the public’) and to identify the attributes that can be used to 
measure the success of a strategy in achieving the objectives (‘radiation dose’, 
‘subjective score of reassurance’). The aim is to enhance understanding of the 
problem, to communicate preferences, values and objectives, and to guide the 
decision makers or stakeholders in their choice of the most preferred action. The 
approach provides a set of techniques to model the decision makers’ preferences. 
It is also possible to incorporate uncertainties and risk attitudes in the decision. 
All in all, MCDA is a learning process that generates insight into the decision 
problem, and it does not automatically provide a problem solution. 
The MCDA approach has been applied to various social and environmental 
decision making problems such as wastewater treatment and wilderness 
preservation (McDaniels 1996; McDaniels and Roessler 1998; Renn et al. 1995; 
Gregory and Keeney 1994). Marttunen and Hämäläinen (1995) applied MCDA 
as an individual interactive computer supported interview method and involved 
a large number of stakeholders in two river development projects. The papers 
by Apostolakis and Pickett (1998), Hämäläinen (1988, 1990, 1992), Hämäläinen 
and Karjalainen (1992), Keeney and von Winterfelt (1994), Keeney (1980) and 
Phillips et al. (2006) are examples of case studies that deal with the clean-up of 
a hazardous waste site, nuclear energy policy and management of nuclear waste. 
In the field of nuclear emergency management, MCDA has been applied and 
facilitated workshops have been organized in various countries (Albrecht et al. 
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1997; Aumonier and French 1992; Bartzis et al. 1999; French et al. 1993, 1996; 
International Chernobyl Project 1991; Hämäläinen et al. 1998, 1999; Ammann et 
al. 2001; Zeevaert et al. 2001; Sinkko et al. 2005; Geldermann et al. to appear).
This report is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the facilitated 
workshop method and its use in the planning of protective actions in a case of 
a nuclear accident. A short overview of the main steps of the MCDA process is 
given in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 discusses the pros and cons of facilitated 
workshops.
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Table I. General guidelines for a workshop.
Welcome everyone and thank them for coming to • work together to achieve the objectives. Introduce 
the support team and let the participants introduce themselves. Make the participants feel that their 
knowledge and views are essential.
Clarify the roles of all participants, facilitator and analysts. Reflect to what extent the stakeholders • 
are adequately represented and the representatives sufficiently competent to achieve the objectives. 
Discuss who will make the final decision.
Clarify the objectives of the workshop and the aspired deliverable at the end of the day. In case of • 
emergency, the objective would probably be to agree on a course of action, whereas otherwise the 
objective could be to induce a learning process to broaden the participants’ understanding of all the 
issues involved and of the actual decision-making process. The deliverable could then be a detailed 
action plan to be followed in similar cases of emergency. 
Describe the method to be used, and the workshop arrangements and ‘rules’.• 
Brief the participants about the problem setting to bring them all to the same level of knowledge • 
about the situation.
Clarify who will use the results of the workshop and to what purpose, and whether the work will • 
be continued. Agree on how the results of the workshop will be published and agree on the level of 
confidentiality (for example, agree that all persons or organizations will be anonymous).
At the end of the day, reflect on the workshop and gather feedback from the participants to further • 
improve the workshop method. Finally, thank the participants for their efforts.
2 Facilitated workshop
A facilitated workshop is an intensive session or working meeting attended by 
key players with different fields of expertise, or representatives of those who 
are likely to be affected by the decision (Phillips and Phillips, 1993). Usually the 
workshop does not have a fixed agenda or prepared presentations. The primary 
arrangement is a small group of key players seated at a semicircle to discuss the 
problem, and a facilitator who keeps the discussion focused and goal oriented, and 
aids in achieving a mutual understanding. Based on the discussion, the views of 
the group are modeled using a decision-analytical approach and decision-aiding 
technology. The facilitator is assisted by an analyst, who builds the model and 
takes notes of the main points of the discussion, of judgments and decisions made 
etc. It is essential that the participants have eye-to-eye contact. Only full-time 
participation is allowed; calendars should be cleared and the use of the mobile 
phones forbidden. Table I presents general guidelines for the workshop.
11
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2.1 Forms of workshops
Ideally a workshop lasts for two or three days, as such an arrangement offers 
time to reflect on the case and revise thinking. During the first day, the relative 
importance of the attributes might be judged, the pros and cons of each option 
analyzed and a preliminary ranking of the available options obtained. In the 
first evening, the participants would have a chance to discuss open issues in 
small groups, digest them over night and come back the next morning with new 
perspectives (French and Papamichail 2003). The second, and possibly the third, 
day could be devoted to analyzing the results, further discussing open issues, 
carrying out sensitivity analyses, and perhaps modifying and re-analyzing the 
model. Finally, the results of the workshop would be summarized and a decision 
made on which action to recommend or implement.
Often, it might be difficult to find a convenient time slot for the whole 
group, and a commitment for two days might not be acceptable for all participants. 
Therefore, shorter forms of decision conferences have been suggested. For 
example, in a spontaneous decision conferencing concept, the whole process can 
be accomplished in just a few hours with minimal arrangements (Hämäläinen 
and Leikola 1995). Alternatively, the workshop can be arranged during a single 
working day. This kind of a process can be seen to better fit the demands and 
restrictions of emergency management.
Yet another approach is the decision analysis interview technique (see e.g. 
Marttunen and Hämäläinen 1995). It is an analysis of a decis ion problem from 
the perspective of one key player at a time. After all the interviews have been 
made, a common meeting with all the participants is recommended to discuss 
the different views of the participants and to resolve the disagreements.
In all cases, careful preparations are of paramount importance for a 
successful workshop. These include agreements on the methods, collection of 
background information, contact creation and various preparatory meetings. 
The shorter and more intensive the workshop is the more pre-arrangements are 
necessary. A preliminary workshop that is attended by a small group of experts 
has been found useful, especially in preparation of an intensive one-day workshop. 
In this way, it can be assured that all pertinent information has been collected. 
It can also be useful to send an information package to the participants prior 
to the workshop. Annex 1 shows, as examples, the invitation letter and Annex 2 
the information package that have been prepared for a workshop dealing with 
clean-up actions in inhabited areas. 
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2.2 Phases of a one-day workshop
In a one-day workshop, the agenda of the workshop should be rather specific, as 
the time frame does not allow much room for improvisation. Several phases can 
be identified in a workshop. Typically, these include at least (i) introduction to 
the approach and the case, (ii) structuring of the problem, (iii) elicitation of the 
preferences, and (iv) analysis of the results. Each of these is expected to last for 
about an hour and a half. 
In the first phase, the facilitator describes the workshop approach and 
the main steps of the process. The participants are provided with background 
information, such as basic principles of radiation protection and possible legal 
issues. The introductory phase ends with briefing the participants on the case 
at hand. An emergency management expert describes the accident scenario and 
the pros and cons of protective actions. In addition, he / she may compare the 
health risk of the accident with other health risks, such as exposure to radon or 
from past accidents.
In the second phase, the problem is explored and issues of concern are 
identified, for example, by using the MCDA approach. This approach is described 
in more detail in Section 3. The goal is to find decision alternatives that are 
worthwhile investigating in detail and the criteria or attributes that could be 
used to discriminate between them. The elicitation of attributes can be done 
for example by using a text editor and projecting key words of the discussion 
on the wall or by using Post-Its. During the discussion the participants are 
encouraged to suggest new attributes or to modify and group the given ones. It 
is a good idea to collaboratively define the attributes in order to create a common 
understanding of their meaning. The criteria are eventually arranged in form of 
an attribute or value tree (see Figure 5 of Annex 2). There may be also iterations 
in this process: attributes may be refined and new decision alternatives may 
be identified. The facilitator keeps the discussion focused and tries to ensure 
that all concerns are addressed and the final attribute tree is acceptable to all 
participants. The outcome of this phase is a computer-based decision model. It 
comprises the attribute tree, the list of decision alternatives, and a decision table 
that contains numerical assessments of the attributes of each decision alternative 
(cf. e.g. Belton and Stewart 2002). Sometimes the consequences of the decision 
alternatives (i.e. attributes) can not be assessed instantly during the workshop, 
and a predefined set of decision alternatives has to be used.
In the third phase, the relative importance of attributes is judged, and 
overall preferences of the decision alternatives are obtained. These can be further 
investigated with sensitivity analyses. The elicitation of preferences can be 
carried out jointly with all the participants, or within groups of two or three people 
representing the same stakeholder group. In the latter case, a wider variety of 
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views can be collected. Each group can have a portable computer to work with 
their decision model, and the results can be collected through a wireless local 
area network (WLAN) and a computer acting as a server. In the final phase a 
conclusion of the analysis is drawn and the further course of actions is decided.
Figure 1 shows the main steps of the decision analysis process. As can be 
seen from the figure, it is an iterative process, as it is often necessary to go back 
and revise an earlier stage. 
2.3 Workshop participants
The ‘right’ participation is consensual and non-hierarchical (Renn et al. 1995). 
An ethically sound ‘rule’ about who should participate in a facilitated workshop 
is that representatives of all those who have an interest (a ‘stake’) in the 
decision considered should be invited. The set of participants should comprise a 
representative sample of stakeholders and the affected public so that all views 
and objectives can be included in the process. Participants might be members of 
central governmental or local authorities, representatives of expert organizations, 
industry, producers and representatives of citizens. The selected individuals 
should be apt candidates for an open, participatory process that relies on such 
skills as listening, learning and mutual co-operation. Each participant should 
also be a proper spokesperson of his / her respective interest group, and everyone 
has an equal right to contribute to the discussion.
Protective actions in a nuclear emergency would influence the population 
and thus a representative participation of the affected population is important 
to create a fair and competent decision making process. Therefore, participants 
should represent broadly the public and the involvement should be done as early 
as possible, for example, by planning in advance (see e.g. Rowe and Frewer 2000). 
Suitable representatives could be, for example, members of local organizations 
and fellowships. Recent research from Beierle and Cayford (2002) has questioned 
the concern that the public makes bad decisions. Their survey of case studies 
suggests that people are perfectly capable of improving the quality of decisions, 
for example, through their knowledge of local circumstances.
There should be preferably no more than about 20 participants in a 
workshop to keep the discussion intensive and effective. A group of 20 is small 
enough to allow working towards a consensus on the problem and large enough to 
represent all views. In addition, all the participants have ample opportunities to 
express their views and judgments. An optimal group setting encourages people 
to participate actively in the discussion as speakers and listeners.
It is recommended to send an invitation letter to the participants prior to 
the workshop (see Annex 1) attached with appropriate information on the event. 
14
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Figure 1. The main steps in the decision analysis. RODOS is a consequence assessment 
software for nuclear emergency management.
 Present the radiological situtation, its diagnosis, prognosis uncertainties and assumptions made to the participants. 
Preference elicitation. Combine individual 
preferences or elicit group preferences directly. 
    Present possible countermeasure strategies to 
   the participants. 
Choose the best countermeasure strategy. 
Perform sensitivity analyses. 
Are the 
participants satisfied with the 
results? 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No 
 
Discuss 
accident scenario. Is all relevant and available information 
 included? 
Are the 
   participants satisfied with the 
 strategies? 
No 
No 
Use RODOS to calculate the data on the impacts 
  and present it to the participants. 
 
Are the 
   participants satisfied with 
 the data? No 
Yes 
Yes 
Assess the impacts not calculated by RODOS. 
 
Are the 
   participants satisfied with the 
 impacts? No 
Yes 
 
Define the attributes and build a value tree. Or 
 choose a prestructured value tree. 
Yes 
 
Are the 
    participants satisfied with the value 
tree? No 
Yes 
Is 
there a consensus on the 
  weights? No 
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This includes a list of participants, information on practical arrangements and 
a technical information package describing the problem. Personal contact with 
each participant is essential before sending the invitation letter, as it helps to 
motivate the person and allows verifying that he or she is interest in the problem 
and the method.
Experience has shown that the motivation of the participants is important 
to the workshop to succeed (Beierle and Cayford 2002). The workshop itself 
usually keeps the participants motivated as they actively take part in the 
discussions, share their views and contribute to the decision. The participants 
experience (or should be made experiencing) that their abilities and skills are 
important, which might help them better cope with the possible adversities 
arising the process.
Phillips (1984) has argued that decision conferencing produces conditions 
for creative and effective decision making when the participants are not on their 
home ground. Thus, the sessions should take place in conference rooms, or in an 
especially designed room on the facilitator’s premises that is a neutral ground 
for all the participants. 
2.4 Role of the facilitator 
The facilitator of a workshop guides and helps neutrally the group to work 
together to find a solution to the problem. The facilitator is not a stakeholder, 
chairperson or group leader, and he / she should only concentrate on the process. 
The content is left to the participants, who share their understanding and are 
committed to the resolution through providing the content of the discourse, 
setting objectives and evaluating alternatives (French and Papamichail 2003; 
see also Seifert’s ideas for moderation 2002). The facilitator should raise issues 
neutrally, come back to open matters, ask simple questions to ensure that all 
have interpreted the issue in the same way and clarify, or ask the participants to 
clarify, any jargon which may cause misunderstanding. The facilitator should be 
experienced in decision analysis and have some knowledge of nuclear emergency 
management. However, our experience has shown that he / she should come from 
outside the radiation protection community to be neutral and independent. Yet, 
one should note that each facilitator has his / her own way of facilitating, and 
this may affect the action plan devised. For a discussion of different facilitation 
practices, see Papamichail et al. (2007).
Phillips and Phillips (1993) have made the following list for facilitation:
one of the main tasks of a facilitator is to see and understand the group • 
life: anger, frustration, emotions, concerns and ‘group think’; 
16
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a facilitator should not contribute to the content; that would damage • 
his / her integrity as a neutral outsider; 
a facilitator should understand what is going on by summarizing, seeking • 
clarification and asking questions; 
a facilitator should not evaluate the group’s work. • 
In general, the facilitator’s role is to keep the discussion focused on the problem 
at hand and try to prevent the participants from falling in personality-oriented 
conversation (Ackermann 1996, French and Papamichail 2003). He / she should 
encourage the participants to express their views and take care that the views 
of minorities are debated fairly. Possible conflicts should also be calmed down 
at an early stage of the process. 
The decision analysis method might not be understood completely although 
the facilitator has understandably described the methods and the process to 
the participants during each step. Therefore, simple examples could be used to 
clarify each task. There could also be technical assistants available to help the 
participants if they experience any problems or have questions. 
Facilitation is a sensible task where common sense deliberation plays a 
major role (Renn et al. 1995). Firstly, any facilitation revives disputes and reminds 
the parties of their conflicts. If opinion differences are realized, participants may 
tend to escalate the conflict rather than try to resolve it. Secondly, reaching a 
consensus is not always the most important driving force of individual participants. 
Some participants may feel (consciously or subconsciously) that their own 
objectives are more important than the other participants’ objectives, or they 
are more apt ‘to prevent their opponents from being better off ’ and ‘to receive 
more public support or reputation’ than to reach a consensus. Furthermore, in 
discussions people often have a need to protect their social identity and face, and 
may be troubled with their emotionality, anger, frustration, shame, etc.
In some situations, some participants may question the benefit of using 
a quantitative model utilizing subjective judgments. In these cases, it could be 
stressed that mathematical methods are only applied to support the modeling 
but the main idea of the analysis lies in a clear definition of attributes and action 
alternatives, in the consequence assessment of actions, and in weighting the 
relative importance of the consequences. The facilitator can also justify modeling 
by pointing out that the use of numbers ensures that options and criteria are 
defined better and that all aspects are considered. In addition, quantification 
helps to identify areas of critical importance and disagreement. There may also be 
differences in interpreting the consequences of different options. In this respect, 
the use of numbers, for example, probabilities 0.6 or 0.8, instead of the wording 
‘it’s likely to happen’, can help to better understand other opinions. 
17
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2.5 Use of computers and other supporting tools
Computers are typically used during the workshop to carry out numerical 
calculations and display results graphically and interactively. The simplest setup 
consists of a single computer used only by the analyst or the facilitator. In this 
case, the group builds one model that is evaluated together as a group. A more 
demanding setup is that all participants, or groups of participants representing 
the same stakeholders, interact themselves with a decision analysis software to 
elicit preferences on the jointly structured attribute tree. The setup could consist 
of a separate computer with decision analytical software for each participant 
(or group or participants) and a local area network to collect and combine the 
individual decision models. A projector could be used to show the preference 
models of the individual participants to all others with the aim to communicate 
their preferences.
Working in groups allows analyzing the stakeholders’ preferences separately 
in each group (Mustajoki et al. 2007). It is important that each participant 
assesses and clarifies his / her own preferences and can also see and discuss other 
participants’ views. Experience has shown that in most cases participants are 
able to use evaluation software such as Web-HIPRE (Hämäläinen and Mustajoki 
1998; Mustajoki and Hämäläinen 2000) by themselves. A couple of technical 
assistants are usually sufficient to answer possibly arising questions.
A dedicated web page for the workshop containing information about 
the case and the methods used was found to be useful. Information can then 
be displayed on individual screens or projected onto a large screen for all the 
participants to see. Afterwards, the results of the workshop could be published 
on the same web page. 
Computers powerfully assist the facilitator in his / her tasks and help 
the participants to deal with differences in opinions. The use of any technology 
should not, however, dominate or divert the participants from the real issues; 
nor should it hinder face-to-face contact of the group members.
18
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3 Multi-criteria decision analysis
Decision analysis is a branch of Operations Research, which has its roots in 
mathematics, economics and psychology. It can be applied to obtain a deeper 
understanding of a decision problem and all the key players’ objectives and values. 
It helps organizing the available information, incorporating value judgments, and 
it guides the discussion with the aim to help people make better choices. It also 
provides a set of techniques to evaluate and rank options according to people’s 
preferences. MCDA, in particular, deals with problems of multiple attributes. The 
MCDA theory is described in detail in the literature (Keeney and Raiffa 1976; Keeney 
1992; von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986; French 1988; Goodwin and Wright 1992; 
Hammond et al. 1999; Belton and Stewart 2002). This section briefly explains it and 
how it can be applied in facilitated workshops on nuclear emergency management.
An essential feature of MCDA is to break down complicated decisions into 
small and more understandable pieces that can be dealt with individually and 
then recombined logically. In this way, the relevant objectives and alternative 
actions can be systematically investigated and insight achieved about the action 
consequences and value judgments. Additionally, an analytical approach can be 
helpful in identifying informational needs.
It is recognized that people can benefit from the support and guidance of 
structured decision analysis. In contrast, in recurrent decisions based on daily 
experience, it might be simpler, more efficient and more acceptable to decide 
without recourse to any formal analysis. However, nuclear accidents are very 
rare and their consequences dissimilar. Therefore, the decision making process 
cannot be based on daily experience. 
Another motivation for the use of MCDA is that when left to their own 
devices, people easily create and hold on to many kinds of inconsistent beliefs 
and preferences (Bazermann 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Spetzler and 
Staël von Holstein 1975; Gregory et al. 1993). This view is supported by research 
indicating that the correlation between preference rankings derived from holistic 
judgment and those derived from decision analyses decreases as the number of 
attributes in the problem increases (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). Even 
in the absence of seriously conflicting objectives, unguided intuitive decision 
making is susceptible to many forms of inconsistency. People’s preferences may 
be dictated by the presentation of a problem and not by its underlying structure, 
which may lead to irrationality. 
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3.1 MCDA approaches
Multi-attribute value theory (MAVT) and multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) 
(see Keeney and Raiffa 1976) are widely used decision analysis techniques for 
problems with multiple attributes. They have axiomatic foundations, and they 
are applicable in facilitated workshops where the purpose is to guide the thinking 
of the key players, help them to make consistent judgments and to choose 
rationally. There are also other multi-attribute evaluation methods that could 
be applied, such as the analytic hierarchy process, fuzzy decision analysis and 
multi-attribute outranking analysis. For a discussion of these, see, for example, 
Belton and Stewart (2002). 
The consequences of alternative courses of action can rarely be predicted 
with certainty. For example, the actually released amounts of contaminants are 
always uncertain. Even if the fallout pattern has been measured, the spatial 
dose variation can be substantial. MAUT is designed to allow uncertainties 
and risk attitudes of decision makers to be taken into account. For example, 
it is possible to use the individual dose instead of the collective dose in the 
calculations by considering the individual dose distribution. There is also software 
that makes it possible to incorporate distributions into the analysis (Smith 
2002). Incorporation of uncertainties into an analysis, however, requires an 
understanding of probabilities and – if done in an orthodox way – a series of 
potentially difficult questions for decision makers.
MAVT does not explicitly take the stakeholders’ risk attitude or 
uncertainties into account but sensitivity analyses can be used to study effects 
of possible uncertainties in single attributes. Interval approaches (see e.g. Salo 
and Hämäläinen 1992, 1995) can be applied to study the sensitivity of the result 
to a variation of several attributes simultaneously (Mustajoki et al. 2006).
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) has also been applied to beforehand planning of 
protective actions (IAEA 1994; Gjörup et al. 1992). It has its grounds in economic 
theory. Typically, the analysis provides decision makers with information and 
it does not require decision makers to express value judgments (French 1988). 
Therefore, the CBA method is not very applicable in workshops where value 
judgments are made by the key players. Another apparent difference is that in 
MAVT the values of attributes are converted into common units, whereas in the 
CBA, monetary units are used. That is, all effects are translated into financial 
values regardless of how intangible these might be. CBA does not have natural 
ways to incorporate uncertainties in the modeling as, for example, MAUT does 
(French et al. 2005).
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3.2 Problem formulation
The first task in the MCDA process is to identify the problem itself, as before 
being able to make a decision, the decision maker has to realize what the 
problem actually is. In this phase, it is essential to try to find out all the key 
characteristics of the problem. The framing of the problem is, however, not always 
straightforward. A problem that initially seems to be clear and reasonably defined 
may in a further analysis prove to be a part of a larger entity, and the problem 
should actually be considered in this larger context.
One should also note that the whole MCDA process is often iterative, 
and the most innovative ideas are obtained by considering different 
phases of the process interchangeably. For example, a thorough analysis of 
various objectives and alternatives may bring up new views that pose the 
problem in a whole new light. In such cases, the decision maker should go 
back to the problem definition and reframe the problem according to this 
new information.
3.3 Objectives and attributes
The identification of objectives that are relevant to the decision problem is also 
one of the key phases of the process (see e.g. Keeney 1992, 1994). To be more 
useful and understandable, objectives should be measurable, because in decision 
analysis numerical scales are used to evaluate how the objectives can be achieved 
by certain actions. The related numerical variables are typically called attributes. 
One should, however, note that the terms objective, attribute and criterion are 
not always used consistently in the literature.
Objectives and attributes are not always evident, and time and effort is 
needed to specify them clearly and fully. Incomplete specification will often lead 
to too narrow a focus (Hammond et al. 1999). Objective identification can be 
facilitated, for example, by reflecting the respects in which the alternative courses 
of action differ, or by listing the pros and cons of each alternative. It might also 
be helpful to refer to attribute definitions of similar cases.
An attribute hierarchy, also called a value or attribute tree, can be useful 
in defining objectives and attributes (Keeney 1992). The overall goal is on the 
top and it branches into rather general and sometimes vague objectives. These 
can be divided further into sub-objectives, which become more specific the lower 
down the tree one goes. The building of the objective hierarchy is continued 
until all objectives are measurable, operational and easy to assess judgmentally. 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) propose the following criteria for examining the 
applicability of the attributes: completeness, operationality, decomposability, 
absence of redundancy and minimum size.
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International organizations with a mandate in radiation protection 
have emphasized that the basis for a decision must be understandable and 
acceptable to the public (ICRP 2000; OECD / NEA 2002). Thus, the reasoning 
behind the decision of what action to take needs to be clearly explained to 
everyone concerned. This emphasizes the need to understandably define the 
possible protective actions and attributes. The aforementioned organizations 
have listed generic objectives for nuclear emergency management, which 
include minimizing the radiation dose, physical risks, monetary costs, anxiety 
and disruption of social life, and maximizing the reassurance produced by the 
intervention (ICRP 1993, 2000; IAEA 1994). In addition, various case studies 
have been performed in the recent years which dealt with the decision problem 
of nuclear emergency management and in which various attribute trees have 
been adopted (Ammann et al. 2001; Atherton and French 1998; French 1992; 
French et al. 1993, 1996; Hämäläinen et al. 1998, 1999; Hedemann-Jensen 
et al. 1996; Morrey and Potter 1994; Sinkko et al. 1994; Sinkko 2004; Sinkko 
et al. 2005). Based on these publications the following list of attributes is 
suggested:
Individual dose to the public. Some members of the public might be subject 
to a relatively high stochastic risk or to a risk of incurring deterministic 
effects. This risk has to be considered individually and can be measured by 
the individual dose. It is important to be aware that there is a correlation 
between the collective and individual doses and hence too much weight 
would be given on radiation related health effects if both are used in a 
decision analysis (Sinkko et al. 1994). This attribute can be measured with 
effective external dose and / or organ dose in normal living conditions and, 
when an action is taken, integrated over the action period (e.g. sheltering 
or evacuation time, units in mSv).
Collective dose to the public. The standard assumption within the radiation 
protection community is that exposure to radiation increases the risk of 
cancer, regardless of how small the exposure is. If the individual risk is very 
small, stochastic health effects are still expected when large population 
groups are exposed. This attribute could be measured as the projected 
collective dose to the public (manSv). It could also be converted into the 
expected number of fatal cancer cases or number of cancer incidents 
in order to be more understandable for persons outside the radiation 
protection community. Except for thyroid cancers, it can be assumed 
that roughly half of the cancer cases can be cured, i.e. there are twice as 
many incidents as fatal cases. This attribute can be estimated with the 
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additional number of cancer cases or collective doses with and without 
countermeasure options. 
Either projected dose or avertable dose can be used in decision 
analysis. The advantage of the projected dose is the additional information 
it gives: if it is high it may indicate that an action is warranted. Preferences 
over values of projected dose could also be taken into account by using 
concave (saving of a unit of dose is more preferred when doses are low than 
when doses are high) or convex (saving of a unit of dose is more preferred 
when doses are high than when doses are low) value functions. 
Number of thyroid cancers amongst children. Thyroid cancer deserves 
special attention because this type of cancer predominantly afflicts children. 
In addition, thyroid cancer has a latency time of only a few years, is rare 
and can be easily seen in statistics. Better response to treatment of thyroid 
cancer is another aspect that supports including it as an own attribute. That 
is, less than 2% of thyroid cancers prove to be fatal (Demidchik et al. 2006), 
whereas for all other types of cancer, an average of 50% of cancer cases 
cause premature death. The risk factor to calculate the number of thyroid 
cancer cases is 0.01 per Gy for children (NCRP 1985). This attribute can 
be measured with the thyroid dose in children from intake of radioiodine 
in normal living conditions and when an action is taken (mGy).
Number of thyroid cancers amongst adults. A separation of the number of 
thyroid cancer cases into those expected in children and those in adults might 
be useful. A similar breakdown for other cancer types might also be helpful. 
This attribute can be measured with the thyroid dose in adults caused by 
radioiodine in normal living conditions and when an action is taken (mGy).
Dose to the workers. This attribute represents the projected individual 
dose received by the rescue or clean-up workers that implement, generally 
outdoors, the protective actions. If large numbers of these workers are 
exposed to radiation (e.g. during clean-up actions) the increased number 
of expected fatal cancer cases in the group or their collective dose (manSv) 
could also be used as an attribute. Dose limits to workers are cut-off values 
for the attribute, as it must be assured that workers are not exposed to higher 
doses. This attribute can be measured as the effective dose (mSv) or organ 
(in particular skin) dose (mGy) that workers receive during work hours.
Statistical non-radiation fatalities. The risk of accidents during or due 
to protective actions might not be much higher than the risk associated 
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with normal human activities and thus the number of fatalities is largely 
dependent on the number of people affected by protective actions. It has 
been concluded that the health risk introduced by stable iodine prophylaxis, 
prolonged sheltering or evacuation is very low (Aumonier and Morrey 1990). 
Since there is only sparse information on risks of countermeasures caused 
by accidents, general statistics might be used as an initial approximation 
for the risk of e.g. road accidents during evacuation travel. This attribute 
can be measured as the number of fatalities or reduced life expectancy in 
the alternatives considered.
In some accident scenarios there might be population groups that 
have a higher risk of suffering death in the course of implementing the 
countermeasures. Thus, it might be important to consider these groups 
separately as some countermeasures might endanger their lives. An obvious 
example is the evacuation of newborns, elderly people or patients during 
very bad weather conditions. 
Social disruption. An accident, and how the people react to it, poses a 
severe threat to industry and primary production. Firstly, the accident 
would cause loss of income, for example, due to direct restrictions in 
selling products that exceed the maximum permitted concentration or 
contamination levels. The consumers may also react unpredictably and 
reject all products that are somehow related to the affected area. Exports 
may suffer from a total loss of confidence in a certain country’s products. 
All this adds up to a threat posed to producers and employees in industry, 
and the subsequent loss of their livelihood can cause social disruption. 
Concern on livelihood and value of the property are also important when 
inhabited areas are contaminated. Relocation may break down the social 
network and could be a deeply traumatic experience. On this attribute, 
the alternatives can be evaluated with direct rating. 
Anxiety of the population. Anxiety could be defined as a combination of fear 
and emotions of sadness, guilt, anger and shame (Izard 1977). The majority 
of persons living in a contaminated area may show varying degrees of 
psychological reactions in response to an accident (e.g. miscarriage of unborn 
children). On the other hand, stress may also be introduced by protective 
actions. The severity of an accident is likely to be comprehended through 
the protective measures taken, i.e. the more extensive the measures are, 
the more severe the accident is experienced, and consequently, the higher 
the health risk. On this attribute, the alternatives can be evaluated with 
direct rating.
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Reassurance of the population. In the long run, appropriate and reasonable 
extensive actions may reassure the people living in the affected area. 
Especially measures that people can implement themselves are most 
effective in reducing stress. On this attribute, the alternatives can be 
evaluated with direct rating.
Anxiety of the workers. Emergency actions will cause stress among workers 
who are implementing them. On this attribute, the alternatives can be 
evaluated with direct rating. 
Environmental issues. Protective actions may remedy or deteriorate the 
living conditions of flora and fauna. Environmental issues may be related 
to specific aspects of countermeasures, for example, waste management of 
clean-up actions may cause environmental damages whereas the clean-up 
itself may improve the situation. On this attribute, the alternatives can be 
evaluated with direct rating or with another numerical value, depending 
on the case.
Social feasibility. Some actions may be seen as inadequate (allow to sell 
foodstuffs with an activity concentration below intervention levels) or too 
restrictive (relocation), and such not accepted. People are not ready to 
follow recommendations which are against their wishes or attitudes. On 
this attribute, the alternatives can be evaluated with direct rating.
Technical feasibility. Technical feasibility is understood in relation to 
defined quality or quantity, e.g. tons of clean fodder. This attribute is in 
many cases a constraint preventing the implementation of an action. Large 
cities can hardly be evacuated, and sheltering, too, is difficult. In some 
cases actions may differ in their feasibility, for example, sheltering is more 
feasible than evacuation in bad weather conditions. On this attribute, the 
alternatives can be evaluated with direct rating or with another numerical 
value, depending on the case.
Flexibility of strategies. There may be substantial uncertainties in 
consequence assessment and therefore it should be possible to modify 
strategies as more information is available. On this attribute, the 
alternatives can be evaluated with direct rating.
Monetary costs. This attribute contains the direct and indirect costs of 
protective actions. Cancer treatment costs, associated loss of GDP, and 
25
STUK-A226
other costs that are proportional to the number of cancers should not be 
included in this attribute in order to avoid double counting. This attribute 
can be measured in a monetary unit.
Political objectives and attributes may be part of the decision making on protective 
actions but they need to be clearly defined. Politics is by its definition activity 
directed to social matters – a program or procedure – and it can not be as such 
a measurable attribute. Politicians and authorities write and maintain political 
programs and the definition and incorporation of these attributes in the decision 
making process is their natural task. Political attributes should not be considered 
on the expert level while preparing recommendations.
3.4 Protective actions to be implemented 
One essential stage of emergency management and decision analysis is to identify 
all feasible alternatives of actions. International organizations have published 
generic guidance on the most important protective actions, especially those for 
the early phase (ICRP 1993; IAEA 1994). For planning purposes, protective 
actions have been listed and categorized into those that restrict people’s activities 
or the use of contaminated food or consumables and into those which prevent 
radionuclide incorporation in the human environment, food or consumables. 
A comprehensive list of protective actions for different areas – agriculture, 
inhabited areas – is collected in EU projects such as FARMING, STRATEGY 
(www.strategy-ec.org.uk) and URBAN (Nisbet and Mercer 2002).
In planning countermeasures for the event of a nuclear accident, protective 
actions can be further developed by considering the possibility of changing 
the action’s scale, timing and duration. For example, the composition and size 
of the population group to be protected can be modified. It is useful to iterate 
between the articulation of attributes and creation of alternatives in order not 
to end up with a too limited set of alternatives. All feasible actions have to be 
considered that could be effective in controlling a certain exposure pathway. 
Also the baseline case (taking no action) has to be included in the analysis. 
In defining an action, its technical and social feasibility, and national / local 
circumstances have to be considered (can it be implemented in practice as has 
been planned). 
For a successful implementation of protective actions, the intervention 
area has to be well defined and easily recognizable by the public. It might be 
comprised of a set of administrative units, for example municipalities. Hence, the 
benefits and harm introduced by protective actions has to be aggregated within 
that area. The timing and duration of the proposed protective actions are, in the 
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early phase, related to the presence of the radioactive plume and, later on, to 
the contamination levels on the ground or in foodstuffs. It also has to be clearly 
defined who is affected, what is the action taken, when, where and for how long 
the action is conducted.
Protective actions will in general be justified if the existing annual effective 
individual dose is rising towards 100 mSv. This value may be used as a generic 
reference level for establishing protective actions under nearly any conceivable 
circumstance (ICRP 2000) and could serve as a constraint in the justification 
and optimization process performed by the decision analysis.
Radiological countermeasures aim at reducing doses to the affected 
population, and do not necessarily reduce anxiety or stress. Accidents, however, 
will also cause negative social and psychological impacts. After the Chernobyl 
accident it was observed, for example, that psychological health consequences 
were the most significant when compared with economical and radiological ones 
(Allen et al. 1996; IAEA 1994). It has been concluded that additional actions are 
needed to mitigate such social and psychological impacts. These can include, for 
example, debriefing meetings where the victims of the accident can work through 
their anxiety by discussions. 
3.5 Consequence assessment 
Consequences are represented by the values of the attributes, for example, the 
assessed doses and costs with or without the action taken. Regarding attributes 
that have identifiable variables representing them, the measurement of the 
consequences is usually easy. Then, a value function can be used to map the 
consequences to a commensurable 0 – 1 score scale. By using linear value 
functions, the increase of the same amount to a consequence gives an equal 
increase to the score regardless of the initial consequence. However, this is not 
always the case, for example, the change in costs from 0 € to 1 000 € may result 
in a larger decrease in the value than a change from 9 000 € to 10 000 €. In this 
case, one can use, for example, a concave value function to map the consequences 
into scores.
With other attributes, such as reassurance and anxiety, it will be more 
difficult to find appropriate statistics or a variable that can be quantified or 
expressed on a characteristic scale. In these cases, we can use direct rating 
techniques, in which the preferences over the consequences of an attribute are 
expressed on grade scales (see e.g. Keeney and Raiffa 1976). When directly rating 
an attribute, the most preferred alternative is usually given some fixed score 
(e.g. 1 or 100) and the least preferred alternative the score of zero. The other 
alternatives are given scores between these to represent the degree of preference 
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Figure 2. Type of lottery question that can be asked to elicit utility functions i.e. risk 
attitude.
 Option 1 
• Exactly 10 cancer incidents 
Option 2 
• p % chance of 20 incidents 
• 1 - p % chance of “0” incidents 
Utility 
Thyroid cancer (incidents) 
1 
0 
 02   0
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of this alternative on this attribute. The technique seems to be robust so that 
numbers do not always need to be precise. The availability of relevant information 
could be more important than its precision. 
Uncertainties and risk attitudes can be included in the consequence 
assessment by using utility functions instead of value functions. For example, 
if the decision maker is risk avoiding, the utility functions are concave and the 
degree of concavity tells how precautionary he / she is. Risk avoiding attitude 
could be dominating in nuclear emergency management when a population is 
protected against adverse health effects.
The forms of the utility functions are conventionally assessed using 
lotteries (see Figure 2). The particular lottery to be offered to the participants 
when eliciting these utility functions may well leave its mark on their shape. 
A formulation of the lottery closer to the case at hand would be preferable. For 
example, if early phase actions are considered, the lottery question could be the 
following: ‘A release is due to happen, but you do not know when. To elicit the 
utility function you have to assess the probability of the success of evacuation 
in relation to when exactly you would do the evacuation, e.g., in a small town. 
You have two options: to shelter and accept 10 cancer incidents for sure or take 
the risk and evacuate. If you have the people evacuated before the start of 
the release you avoid almost all cancer incidents. However, if not, you have to 
accept 20 cancer incidents. What odds do you need as a minimum for deciding 
on evacuation? Or in other words, what probability of success would make you 
indifferent between these two options.’
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As mentioned above, the incorporation of uncertainties will make the 
analysis more laborious. There is, however, a way to estimate the influence 
of uncertainties. Stewart (1995) has found out by performing Monte Carlo 
calculations that by using expectations of distributions and a simple additive 
model the correct ranking of actions can be obtained in most situations. The 
expectations could be well estimated from three or five point approximations to 
the distributions, i.e. 5%, 50% and 95% fractiles. 
All in all, rational decision making requires that the consequences of 
each action are assessed realistically without overestimation. Conservatism in 
assessment may cause overestimation of the benefit of an action, an excessive 
demand on monetary resources, or an increase in stress among the population. 
Often, the consequences have to be assessed for a specified group of people and 
integrated over the time the countermeasure is implemented. The required 
consequences include, for example, the projected individual effective dose that 
would be received during sheltering or evacuation time, or the number of expected 
cancer incidents during the next 50 or 70 years and its reduction by clean-up actions. 
The aim of the protection strategy in a case of a radiological accident is, 
first of all, to do everything possible to avoid deterministic health effects (e.g. 
death or vomiting) in the affected population. The severity of deterministic 
health effects is related to the dose, and there is a threshold below which no 
such effects are expected. Just below the threshold for deterministic effects, the 
stochastic health risk (i.e. cancer) might be unacceptable high. The projected 
individual dose accumulated in the first hours or in a day (during the plume 
passage) is of special interest since it is a relevant quantity for expressing the 
risk of deterministic health effects or high stochastic risk. Stochastic health 
effects, on the other hand, may be induced by any dose, and only the likelihood 
of occurrence is growing with the dose, not the severity. From a radiological 
point of view, it is important that the aversion of stochastic health effects in the 
population by optimizing protective actions is performed so that the net benefit 
is achieved and that it is as big as possible. 
A straightforward application of the individual dose (or dose rate) as 
a consequence has turned out to be difficult. The individual dose is normally 
calculated in different points of intervention area. The average individual 
dose within, e.g., a municipality might not exceed intervention levels although 
the individual dose might do so at several locations within that municipality. 
Therefore, it would be better to use the individual dose distribution, e.g. three 
point estimates, which however require extra assessments and explanations to 
key players.
There are different consequence assessment tools for nuclear emergency 
management, for example: ARGOS (www.pdc.dk/nucsystems-uk/), COCO-1 
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(Haywood et al. 1991), OECD / NEA (2000), RODOS (Ehrhardt and Weis 2000) 
and WSPEEDI (Chino et al. 2000). These tools can be used to assess, present 
and predict mainly the radiological consequences of an accident and possible 
intervention actions (some also assess the monetary costs). They do not allow, 
however, to calculate all the consequences needed in the decision making process. 
In addition, general purpose software can be utilized in consequence assessment, 
for example, GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and spreadsheets together 
with statistical and production information. 
3.6 Trade-offs 
In all decisions – whether explicit or not – attributes have to be balanced. In 
decision analysis, the attributes are assigned weights that can be seen to reflect 
the trade-offs between the attributes. For example, how much is the society ready 
to invest to avoid a certain dose? The weights can be given directly, or a specific 
weighting method can be used (see e.g. Belton and Stewart 2002).
The preference of an attribute over another depends on the range of values 
they have. For example, the trade-off between cost and number of cancer cases 
will certainly be different if the choice is to be made among strategies that avert 
up to 100 cancer cases at the cost of up to 1 million € in comparison to a choice 
of averting up to 1 cancer case at a cost of up to 100 million €. It is likely that 
in the first example the attribute cost is not given much weight, whereas in the 
second, it is. A thorough assessment of trade-offs is essential for good decision 
making but it is not always an easy matter and prone to mistakes (Keeney and 
Raiffa 1976; Keeney 2002).
The trade-offs are subjective judgments. There are no universal weights as 
they all relate to a specific decision problem. In addition, they change according 
to opinions and are dependent on the resources of a society. There are methods 
that help to estimate trade-off values and studies that shed more light and 
understanding on this issue, for example, studies on willingness to pay and the 
costs of life-saving interventions (Bengsson and Moberg 1993; Katona et al. 2003; 
Ramsberg and Sjöberg 1997, Tengs et al. 1995). These studies report variations 
over 11 orders of magnitude for the weight of cost in relation to health benefits 
with a median of 20 000 – 40 000 US$ per statistical life saved per year. Tengs 
et al. (1995) has concluded that more lives could have been saved by shifting 
resources between life-saving interventions.
However, methods, such as studies on willingness to pay and contingent 
valuation, which are carried out in decision problems to prevent harm, have 
been criticized. The problem with contingent valuation techniques is that ‘they 
capture attitudinal intentions rather than behavior, important information is 
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omitted from questionnaires and their results are susceptible to influence from 
cognitive and contextual biases’ (Gregory et al. 1993). The results of willingness-
to-pay studies are no more useful because case studies are usually poorly 
structured and do not indicate the multidimensional values behind decisions. 
Values are multidimensional and people have strong feelings and beliefs about 
these values, which typically are not numerically quantified and are not expressed 
in monetary terms. Careful structuring of the problem is necessary to identify 
the underlying multidimensional values, attitudes to risk and trade-offs related 
to the problem. These are created during the elicitation process in decision 
analysis. Therefore, it does not seem reasonable to assess trade-off values using 
problem independent studies. Indeed, a proposal has been made to adopt the 
multi-attribute value / utility theory in contingent valuation studies (Gregory
et al. 1993).
3.7 Analysis of the results
As a result, the MCDA process gives the overall scores of the strategy alternatives 
for the group or for each interest group. These describe the overall preferences 
over the alternatives, and are typically analyzed together by projecting them one 
by one on the screen and discussing them jointly. For each model, the facilitator 
points out its essential characteristics in order to achieve an understanding of 
the concept and the preferences of this group. The contribution of the different 
attributes is studied by breaking down the overall scores into corresponding 
components.
One should note that the obtained overall values are not the ultimate 
solution to the problem, but they should be used as a starting point for the further 
discussion of the strategy alternative to be implemented. The aim of the values 
is to describe the preferences of the stakeholders in a common framework and by 
analyzing them to increase understanding of the views of the other stakeholders. 
The given preference and consequence values may not be accurate, but only 
estimates for the true values. The sensitivity of the result to imprecision in the 
model variables can be studied with sensitivity analyses. For example, a single 
parameter sensitivity analysis is carried out to study the changes in the overall 
scores with respect to variations on the ratings and weights.
To ensure that the model reflects the views of the participants, they could 
be asked whether the resulting overall preferences of actions correspond to 
their holistic expectations (Mustajoki et al. 2007). A positive reply is likely to 
ensure that the model captures their views; if this is not the case, there might 
be misunderstandings or biases in the elicitation or the process has changed the 
thinking of the participants.
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4 Discussion
In nuclear emergency management, it is important that all relevant parties 
deliberate together on countermeasures and that protective actions are planned 
in advance. There are different planning methods, which range from managerial 
methods to participatory decision making methods. The managerial method 
is commonly seen more applicable in the early phase of a nuclear emergency 
situation, i.e. when emergency management teams make recommendations based 
on emergency plans. Unfortunately, many times authorities make these plans 
with only little stakeholder or public involvement. 
A joint meeting of authorities and experts is a common way to collect 
information and to prepare emergency plans. Although generic countermeasures 
might be advised, such advice is problematic as protective actions cannot be 
justified and optimized in depth without reference to a particular case (i.e. the 
actual protective actions and their ranking depend on the problem at hand). 
Case studies, when planned in a truthful way, are useful to reveal many practical 
problems and needs for further information. Their findings could be a valuable 
input to international recommendations, too. The case study method has also 
proven to be very educating for the planning team and the participants. 
A facilitated workshop is a participatory method aiming to include the 
concerns of all key players openly and equally in the decisions taken. With a 
proper process of participation, the method can incorporate public values into 
decisions, improve the quality of decisions through local knowledge, resolve 
conflicts among competing interests, build trust in institutions, and educate 
and inform the public. In addition, it can also improve risk communication and 
understanding of risks. Deliberation and the intensity of the process are features 
that increase the possibilities of the facilitated workshop to be successful. The 
facilitated workshop method has been found to be a very applicable method in 
solving environmental decision problems.
The consequence spectrum of nuclear and radiological accidents is likely 
to be wide and will depend substantially on the event, nuclide composition of the 
release, and on the season. This diversity implies that a large number of accident 
situations need to be analyzed to gain a comprehensive picture of the nuclear 
emergency management process, and to derive intervention levels for various 
protective actions. However, recent workshops arranged in various European 
countries have revealed a lot of similarities. For example, the attribute trees 
elicited in these workshops were quite similar (EVATECH 2007). The weights 
of the attributes varied depending on the contamination level given in the 
accident scenario but when the contamination level was alike attributes were 
of comparable importance. Thus understanding of countermeasures could be 
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increased and intervention levels elicited by a limited number of case studies and 
facilitated workshops. Considering the limited resources available and the needs 
of emergency management it could be a good idea to replace some conventional 
exercises with facilitated workshops. 
Facilitation is a very demanding process and requires competence and 
personal skill. It would be beneficial to create a European network of trained 
and skilful facilitators. Ideally they would be capable of facilitating different 
types of environmental problems and not just nuclear emergency ones. The 
network could be a forum for knowledge sharing and a basis to respond to today’s 
demands for participatory decision making process. The decision making process 
in environmental problems is changing more and more from the managerial form 
towards the participatory form where all stakeholders, including the affected 
population, are involved. The responsible organizations also have to increase their 
knowledge in participatory methods to be able to respond to today’s demands and 
to be better prepared for any future accident. In addition, the arrangement of 
facilitated workshops creates a network of stakeholders, and trains and educates 
participants in nuclear emergency management. 
It is also important to learn in which phase of the process facilitated 
workshops fit in. Our experience supports the view that facilitated workshops 
fit well especially into the planning phase where key players with expertise 
in different areas evaluate the options that are given to the eventual decision 
makers for a final debate. It is well known that higher level officials desire advice 
both on what are the alternative courses of action and on the grounds for making 
a decision. It has not yet been tested whether the protective action strategies, 
which were analyzed in the different workshops so far, are already appropriate 
to be given to the eventual decision makers for their evaluation. Nevertheless, 
the work done by Hämäläinen (1988) encourage preparing advice in a workshop 
before the problem is given, for example, to the parliament for its evaluation.
The facilitated workshop method can be very successful in improving the 
quality of decision making and resolving conflicts among competing interests 
of key players. The danger is that the participation of too small a group tends 
to narrow down the incorporation of public values in the decision and the 
education and information of the public (Rowe and Frewer 2000; Beierle and 
Cayford 2002). Attention should be paid to the responsibility of the participants 
to communicate to those whose spokesmen they are. In order to allow wider public 
participation, all relevant material and preliminary results of the analysis could 
be made available on the Internet for comments, possibly at the same time as it 
is distributed to the participants.
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ANNEX 1: INVITATION LETTER
This invitation letter template was worked out by Simon French for the purpose 
of the EVATECH workshop.
<to be written as an official letter of your organization>
<addressee>
Re: EVATECH workshop <date>, <times> and <location>
Dear <addressee>
We are delighted that you have agreed to participate in the that we are 
holding shortly. Your contribution will, we are sure, help us towards a 
successful conclusion. EVATECH is a project in the EU’s 5th Research 
Framework Programme. EVATECH is seeking to understand the nuclear 
emergency management process across Europe and the information and 
decision support needs of the decision makers therein. As part of EVATECH 
we are running a series of workshops in several countries to understand 
the needs of decision makers a few days after a radioactive release from 
a nuclear accident when considering the choice and implementation of 
early restoration actions in inhabited areas. In particular, we are running 
a workshop on <date> from <start time> to <finish time> at <location>. 
The objectives for the workshop are: 
To identify and verify the factors driving decision making in a radi-• 
ological emergency situation
To explore the information needs of all parties involved in decision • 
making workshop
To identify the forms of strategy that relevant organizations wish • 
to consider
To prepare the national report on countermeasures found to be the most 
appropriate in our circumstances and in the studied accident scenario. 
The scenario to be explored will be prepared in advance and a few days 
beforehand you will be sent a description of the hypothetical events 
leading up to the issues to be discussed in the workshop. The workshop 
will be facilitated by <facilitator> who will help us focus on the choice 
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of restoration strategies and on the evaluation of options. However, the 
workshop’s format is far from fixed and you should come prepared to 
contribute your ideas and inputs freely. Do not prepare any data or analyses 
beforehand. We shall not need to venture into any great detail. We intend 
to gain a broad overview of the issues and perceptions that will drive 
decision making on restoration in urban areas. Please clear your diary 
fully for the workshop. In order to focus on the issues and build a shared 
perspective between the participants, it is important that all attend for 
the full discussion. Our intention is that all of us may discuss the issues 
without disruption and outside distraction. There will be coffee breaks etc. 
to make any essential phone calls, but we ask that you do not take calls 
during the meeting. Please let us know if you have any special dietary 
requirements. The output of the meeting will be confidential until there 
is broad agreement on the conclusions and the wording of the report. No 
statements will be attributed to any person in the meeting. The findings 
will be made available to the EVATECH consortium and, again if there is 
broad agreement, more widely. We attach a list of those, who like yourself, 
have agreed to participate. Attached is a map showing <location> and 
suggesting transport links. <you may wish to remark on any transport 
issues such as ‘allow at least ??? min to get from X to Y’, or trains times 
may be found at www.???.???> <Accommodation issues if relevant> 
Before the workshop we invite you also to a short introductory meeting on 
<date> from <start time> to <finish time> at <location>. In that meeting 
the participants of the workshop will be exposed more closely to the 
objectives and working procedures of the workshop. Do contact us if you 
have any questions or concerns about the introductory meeting and / or the 
workshop or about the EVATECH project.
We look forward to seeing you on <date> at <location>.
Yours sincerely
<Name(s) and affiliation(s)>
Attachments:
Institutes or individuals participating
Map, etc.
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ANNEX 2: INFORMATION PACKAGE
Introduction
As a consequence of a major nuclear accident, thousands of square kilometers 
may be unevenly contaminated by radioactive fallout, and various protective 
actions might be needed to reduce the dose to the public from the deposited 
radionuclides. In inhabited areas, a broad range of surfaces is contaminated by 
the radioactive fallout: exteriors and interiors of buildings, streets, trees, bushes 
and lawns in parks and gardens. The contamination level varies depending on 
the release composition, prevailing weather at the time of the fallout, and on the 
surface. Precipitation causes generally higher total deposition. Dry deposition 
contaminates predominately roofs, streets, leaves of trees, bushes and lawns. 
Rain washes these surfaces and contaminants accumulate on the ground and in 
the sewage system. In addition to deliberate decontamination, regular cleaning 
and natural processes, such as precipitation, transport contaminants from 
building surfaces to the topsoil, and from the topsoil into the deeper layers. Such 
processes together with the radioactive decay will reduce the dose-rate in the 
course of time. 
From the radiation protection point of view, the aim of protective actions is 
to reduce the individual as well as the collective dose to the public and at the same 
time not to unduly incur dose to workers carrying out the recovery operations. 
It is also desired to reduce radiological impacts on the environment, to bring 
the contamination under control, and to keep the area in or return it back into 
unrestricted use by feasible decontamination measures. 
A comprehensive overview of the major methods to clean-up large areas is 
available in the literature (Andersson 1996, Andersson and Roed 1999, Andersson 
et al. 1995 and 2003, Brown et al. 1996, IAEA 1989, Lehto 1994). The successful 
implementation of clean-up actions, however, requires adequate knowledge of the 
situation, careful planning in advance, and the involvement of all stakeholders. 
A facilitated workshop provides a suitable forum for identifying those issues 
that the stakeholders and the population of the contaminated areas care about. 
It employs a group process where responsibility is placed on participants to 
assimilate the information and to provide judgments. Decision analytical methods 
are applied in the workshop to define the objectives of clean-up, to identify the 
criteria or performance measures that distinguish between different alternative 
courses of actions, and to assess their relative importance to the decision. The 
aim is to create better decision alternatives and a structured overall view of the 
problem.
The workshop is assumed to be organized about a week after a hypothetical 
accident. The task of the workshop is to evaluate clean-up actions and to reconsider 
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evacuation. The focus is on those actions which could and should be taken during 
the first two or three weeks after the accident in order to be effective. 
Accident scenario
It is assumed that a hypothetical core-damaging and containment leak acci-
dent1 had occurred a week ago at the Loviisa NPP, and that this has led to the 
contamination of the eastern part of the Uusimaa province. The assumed time 
of the accident is in the beginning of June, on a working day. The progress of the 
accident was described as follows (Niemelä 2002):
‘The accident starts with a fire in one of the electrical cabinet rooms causing 
a successful shutdown of the reactor. An independent failure of the emergency 
core cooling system and the effects of the fire prevent core cooling. Containment 
is successfully isolated. Core heat-up starts 3.5 hours after shutdown and one 
hour later the vessel breaches at high pressure. Containment sprays start and 
operate successfully. The debris in the cavity cannot be cooled, however, and 
its temperature reaches 2 500K seven hours after shutdown. Five hours later, 
the temperature has stabilized at 1 600K. Large quantities of hydrogen and 
carbon monoxide are generated. Combustion occurs 43 hours after shutdown 
and causes the containment to fail. As a consequence, radionuclides escape to 
the environment.’
The release began 43 hours after the shutdown, at 08:00, and lasted for 12 
hours. The release rate was not constant as the initial intense release went down 
roughly exponentially in 12 hours. The effective release height was 100 m, which 
corresponded roughly to an initial sensible-heat release rate of a few megawatts 
(the leak was at a height of 60 m). Based on measurements it was concluded that 
the fallout could be explained by the release fractions given in Table I. 
The accident day (first day) was a rainless day over Finland with weak 
winds (4 – 9 m / s) from south and southwest. The wind turned during the second 
night and started to blow from south and the southeast. There were sporadic rain 
showers during the night and in the morning hours on the next day. Thereafter 
the weather was dry again. 
The site of the hypothetical accident is situated 90 km east from the capital 
area of Finland and 10 km southeast from Loviisa town. There are 7 600 inhabitants 
in Loviisa and over one million inhabitants in the whole fallout area (Table II, 
Figure 2).
1  The estimated probability of occurrence of such a containment failure accident leading to a 
significant release is less than one in 100,000 per reactor-year for this NPP.
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Table I. Release fractions used in consequence calculations.
Nuclide group Release fraction
Noble gases 8 · 10-1 
Iodine total 1.1 · 10-2
Alkaline-group (Cs, Rb) 1 · 10-2
Tellurium-group (Te, Se, Sb) 1 · 10-6
Alkaline earth-group (Sr, Ba) < 1 · 10-10
Ruthenium-group (Ru, Mo, Tc) < 1 · 10-10
Lanthanide-group (La, Nb, Zr, Cm, Ce, Nd, Pm, Sm, Eu, Pu,refr. Ox. Nb, Zr) < 1 · 10-10
Table II. Municipalities in the fallout area and the number of inhabitants. 
Artjärvi 1 570 Kerava 30 482 Pernaja 3 783
Askola 4 421 Kärkölä 4 978 Pornainen 4 186
Espoo 216 836 Lapinjärvi 2 995 Porvoo 45 403
Hausjärvi 8 173 Liljendal 1 464 Pukkila 1 936
Helsinki 559 718 Loviisa 7 498 Riihimäki 26 268
Hyvinkää 42 736 Myrskylä 1 974 Ruotsinpyhtää 2 967
Iitti 7 415 Mäntsälä 16 908 Sipoo 17 760
Järvenpää 36 380 Nurmijärvi 34 029 Tuusula 32 915
Kauniainen 8 543 Orimattila 14 202 Vantaa 179 856
The emergency management team of the first day decided to evacuate 
Loviisa and the eastern part of Pernaja. In addition, it recommended sheltering 
during the passage of the plume and intake of stable iodine tablets prior to it 
in the following municipalities: Ruotsinpyhtää, Lapinjärvi, Liljendal and in the 
western part of Pernaja (Figure 1). 
Consequence assessment
It is assumed that the caesium concentration on the ground was measured during 
the first week and the fallout area could be mapped. Some measurements on 
the efficiency of the clean-up actions were also performed. Nevertheless, dose 
assessments are still believed not to be more accurate than by a factor of 2 or 3.
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Figure 1. To protect the population evacuation, iodine prophylaxis and sheltering was 
recommended and implemented before the release in the marked municipalities.
Figure 2. Caesium deposition, affected municipalities and population centers (grey areas).
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Figure 3. Subdivision of the fallout area for consequence assessment.
Table III. Key figures for the five areas and the consequence assessment if no actions 
are taken.
Area NPP Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4
Number of population 28 8 429 6 070 29 600 1 101 614
Number of houses 25 2 191 2 487 10 845 14 4025
137Cs fallout (kBq / m2) 7 423 1 145 273 8 2
Dose in days 1 – 7 (mSv) 19 3 1 0 0
Dose in days 7 – 30 (mSv) 36 5 1 0 0
Dose in days 7 – 365 (mSv) 287 44 11 0 0
70-year dose (mSv) 2 263 213 73 2 0
Collective dose, 70 y (manSv) 63 1 797 440 67 283
Increased cancer cases 6 180 44 7 28
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There was rain in Loviisa, Liljendal, Lapinjärvi, Pernaja and Ruotsinpyhtää 
during the plume passage, which caused wet deposition in parts of these 
municipalities (over 50 kBq / m2). Close to the nuclear power plant the measured 
fallout is over 5 000 kBq / m2. Elsewhere up to Mäntsälä the fallout is 5 – 50 kBq / m2 
and a decade lower in the capital area of Finland. 
The 134Cs fallout is equal in magnitude to the one from 137Cs, and the 
deposition of 131I is ten times higher. In this scenario the lifetime dose is mainly 
caused by caesium isotopes and only a few percents are caused by iodine. The dose 
rate is high during the first week after the accident as a result of the iodine fallout. 
This has to be taken into account when planning clean-up actions. 
For the purpose of analyzing clean-up actions, the major fallout area has been 
subdivided into five areas (Area NPP and Areas 1 to 4 in Figure 3) according to the 
caesium fallout but taking into account demographic and administrative features. 
With the exception of the municipalities of Loviisa, Pernaja and Ruotsinpyhtää 
(which have been divided so that the dividing line passed through sparsely 
populated areas), the subdivision is made along the municipality borders. Table 
III gives an assessment of the consequence within these areas if no clean-up actions 
are performed. 
Area NPP is the most contaminated area but it has only 28 inhabitants 
(Figure 4). The 137Cs fallout is more than 5 000 kBq / m2 in that area and the dose 
rate caused by the fallout is 0.6 mSv / h in the first hours after the plume passage. 
The estimated 70-year dose is over 2 000 mSv. 
Area 1 consists of Loviisa town and the eastern part of the municipality 
of Pernaja. The average 137Cs fallout is 1 000 kBq / m2 in that area. The NPP and 
Loviisa were evacuated prior to the release and the inhabitants of Pernaja were 
recommended to take iodine tablets and to shelter indoors during the plume 
passage. If the inhabitants of Loviisa returned to their homes one week after their 
evacuation they would receive a dose of 5 mSv by the end of June and 213 mSv in 
70 years. These figures might be put into perspective by comparing them to the 
dose that the inhabitants of that area receive from the inhalation of radon, which 
is estimated to be 7 mSv in one year and 500 mSv in 70 years.
Area 2 encompasses Liljendal, Lapinjärvi and the southern part of 
Ruotsinpyhtää. The fallout is very uneven in these municipalities and the estimated 
population weighted average is 270 kBq / m2. The inhabitants were recommended 
to take iodine tablets and to shelter indoors during the plume passage. 
There was no rain in other areas during the plume passage and the 137Cs 
fallout ranged between 5 and 50 kBq / m2 in Area 3, and between 0.5 and 5 in Area 
4, respectively. 
The release has contaminated various surfaces of the living environment. 
To what extent a contaminated surface contributes to the dose depends on various 
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Figure 4. Loviisa town and the Area NPP (marked with ochre).
factors: on the type and composition of the deposition, the time spent in the 
proximity of such surfaces and the shielding by building material. Assuming 
normal living conditions, the major contribution to the lifetime dose comes from 
the soil, about 60 – 80%, if the fallout contains caesium (Andersson 1996, Brown 
1996, Moring and Markkula 1997). In urban downtown environments (office 
areas), the main contributors to the dose are walls and roofs, 30 – 60%. Under dry 
deposition situation, the contribution of walls is about 5 – 10% and that of roads and 
pavements about 5%. Roofs contribute to about 10%. Because Finnish buildings 
are quite air-tight, the lifetime dose from the indoor contamination is negligible if 
the ventilation is shut down during the plume passage.
If no recovery operations are taken, the contamination remains in the 
area. The dose rate will, however, decrease in the course of time through natural 
processes (radioactive decay, weathering, migration to deeper soil layers, wash off, 
resuspension) and human activities (construction, regular cleaning). 
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Clean-up techniques
The aim of the workshop is to choose the most appropriate strategy for cleaning 
up the contaminated inhabited areas. A strategy is an action plan that tells what 
housing area is cleaned up and by what technique. Also relocation needs to be 
considered in this action plan.
Requirements for the clean-up actions in this scenario are that they are 
applicable on a large-scale during summertime and that their early implementation 
is possible. There are methods which are considered not to be applicable when 
large areas have to be decontaminated during the first weeks after the accident 
(e.g. peelable coatings, road planning, skim and burial ploughing and sand 
blasting). Such techniques were rejected due to their poor effectiveness, high cost or 
low feasibility.
The following clean-up techniques are selected for further consideration.
Washing of buildings
In general, fire hosing of roofs and walls with tap water removes relatively 
little activity from building surfaces and has only a minor effect in terms of 
dose reduction. However, in some cases it can be considered, especially in dry 
deposition scenarios, shortly after the accident and for detached houses where 
the dose reduction has been assessed to be moderate. The efficiency of the method 
can be improved significantly by using a brush in order to remove also organic 
materials. High pressure water treatment (through a turbo nozzle) could also be 
used for decontamination of roofs and walls. Other methods, e.g., sandblasting 
and ion-exchange, are generally expensive.
A serious problem with hosing and high pressure water treatment is controlling 
the water and aerosols that could contaminate the soil around the buildings and 
thus increase the dose rate. The water has to be collected, contaminated soil 
removed and the waste disposed.
Vacuum sweeping of streets
Wet sweeping or wet vacuum sweeping are suggested for the roads. If municipal 
road-cleaning machines (with rotating brushes and vacuum attachment) or mere 
mechanical rotating brooms on tractors are enough, it would be possible to sweep 
the streets much faster and therefore less expensively. In a series of experiments 
on a freshly contaminated road, the wet vacuum sweeping removed in some cases 
twice as much contaminants as sweeping with an ordinary broom (Andersson 
1996). The efficiency of the method has been found to be greatly dependent on the 
amount of street dust per square meter. 
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Fire hosing of streets is assumed to be done with normal tap water or with a 
tanker lorry. In fire hosing water washes the contaminants away from the roads into 
the drainage system for rainwater. Dependent on the construction of the drainage 
system the rainwater is either led into the purification system and mixed with the 
purified sewage or led directly into lakes or the sea. During sewage purification 
about half of the contamination remains in the sewage sludge and the other half 
will be released with the purified sewage (Puhakainen 2004) and will eventually 
end up in ditches, rivers, lakes and seas.
Grass removal
As a decontamination measure, contaminated grass can be cut normally and 
safely deposited. Grass cutting should preferably be done with a cutter that 
has a collector attached. If a collector is not available, the cut grass has to be 
raked up. However, hand raking in large areas is not feasible. The cut grass is 
subsequently collected and buried at a controlled disposal site. If grass cutting 
is done within a few days after the dry deposition it is effective in reducing the 
dose. The transfer process of caesium contamination from grass to soil has been 
found to have a half-life of about 15 days. It is also a cheap method and because 
people can do it by themselves it will also relieve their anxiety.
Grass removal is most effective in a dry deposition situation and when done 
within two weeks after the fallout. After a few weeks it is useless. The method can 
also be considered in wet fallout situations.
Foliage removal
In addition to grass, trees and bushes are effective interceptors of airborne particles. 
By removing trees and bushes in the vicinity of buildings the dose will be reduced 
considerably, but only if done in the first years. It is assumed that branches of 
deciduous trees are cut off and conifer trees are felled. Leaves have to be collected 
and disposed of in the fall. 
Pruning or felling of trees is effective in dry deposition situations and when 
done in the first month after the fallout. After the first year it is useless. 
Topsoil removal
Since the downward migration of caesium is slow, scraping the topsoil will be 
effective for years after the fallout. Soil samples have shown that the fallout 
from the nuclear weapons test explosions in the sixties and from the Chernobyl 
accident can still be detected in the top 30 cm (Ilus 2004). 
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Scraping of turf, about 5 cm, is assumed to be carried out using a spade 
in small scale, and a digger and a front loader in large areas. The problem with 
scraping of soil is the generation of large amounts of waste. If fertile soil or / and 
vegetation is removed the method should also include reconstruction of land and 
planting of vegetation.
Covering contaminated surfaces with clean soil, concrete or asphalt is most 
applicable in small scale. Covering the contamination with clean soil and scraping 
the topsoil are applicable independent of the type of fallout and the time elapsed 
since the accident.
In rotovating, the contamination is mixed within the upper 10 –  15 cm 
of soil but when using digging and ploughing methods the contamination is 
relocated somewhat deeper in soil. Digging could be considered in small scale and 
ploughing and rotovating in large urban areas, as in open parks or fields. During 
deep-ploughing the soil is turned up to 45 cm whereas with an ordinary plough to 
about 25 cm. In digging and ploughing, there is no waste generated. An especially 
advantageous solution would be the application of a specially constructed skim 
and burial plough which has approximately the same dose-reducing effect as deep-
ploughing but leaves the soil quality unaffected. The efficiency of these procedures 
will depend greatly on the soil type. In stony soil and areas having dense vegetation 
the methods are not feasible.
Evaluation of clean-up actions
In order to assess the dose, costs and total amount of waste of the various clean-up 
actions, information is needed on the average size of the treated surfaces and on 
the population distribution. The size of the treated areas depends on the house 
type (Table IV), and the weighted average is calculated with geo-statistical data 
on the number of houses of a given type per square kilometer (Central Statistical 
Office of Finland 1996). This figure is multiplied with the estimated costs and 
waste per unit of the treated surface area (Table V). The avertable collective 
dose of a particular clean-up action is calculated by multiplying the number of 
persons of each square kilometer living in a given house type (Central Statistical 
Office of Finland 1996) with the dose estimate for the relevant house type and 
square kilometer. 
Table VI gives the dose reduction factors estimated for this work (Andersson 
1996, Moring and Markkula 1997).
The labor costs are estimated to be 25 € / hour including overheads. Digger, 
lorry, front loader and vacuum sweeping costs with a machinist are estimated to 
be 50 € / hour. The workers’ dose, man-hour and the generated waste are based 
on the following assumptions: 
54
STUK-A226 ANNEX 2
Table IV. Size of the surface areas per house type that is assumed to be treated by 
clean-up actions.
House type Roof
m2
Walls
m2
Streets
m2
Yard1)
m2
Detached houses 120 150 400 600
Row houses 300 400 700 600
Blocks of flats 450 1 000 1 000 2 000
Other type 120 150 500 600
1) If parks in the area are also in the treated yard, the area should be increased by 100 – 200 m2.
Table V. Estimated monetary costs, waste generated and man power needed per unit 
of treated surface area by the selected clean-up techniques. 
Clean-up action Labour costs
€ / 1 000 m2
Disposal costs
€ / 1 000 m2
Waste
kg / 1 000 m2
Working hours / 1 000 m2,
per detached house
Street hosing 350 0 0 10
Street sweeping 15 1.6 100 0.3
Roof washing 750 16 10 000 water 33, 4 h / roof
Wall washing 200 16 10 000 water 11, 1.7 h / house
Grass cutting 75 0.8 10 3, 2.5 h / yard
Tree pruning 120 16 0.8 5.3, 4.3 h/ yard
Turf removal 400 800 75 000 24, 19 h / yard
Table VI. Estimated dose reduction in percents of the effective lifetime dose (70 years) 
for the selected clean-up techniques in a case of dry and wet deposition of 137Cs. 
Type of 
fallout
Roof 
washing 
Wall 
washing
Street 
sweeping 
Tree 
pruning  
Grass 
cutting 
Turf 
removal
Detached houses dry 7 8 4 9 50 60
Wooden wet 7 7 4 1 15 75
Detached houses dry 10 4 4 10 45 58
Brick wet 10 3 4 1 15 72
Row houses dry 6 2 5 6 55 71
wet 4 1 6 1 15 76
Blocks of flats dry 1 3 7 4 59 74
wet 1 2 15 0 15 77
55
STUK-A226ANNEX 2
Table VII. Consequence assessment for permanent resettlement of the population of 
Area NPP.
Permanent resettlement
Average avertable dose (mSv) 2 260
Avertable collective dose (manSv) 63
Avertable number of cancer cases 6
Costs (M €) 400
Table VIII. Consequence assessment for evacuation and permanent resettlement of the 
population of Area 1.
Evacuation 
days 7 – 14
Evacuation 
days 7 – 30
Permanent 
resettlement
Average avertable dose (mSv) 2 5 210
Avertable collective dose manSv) 17 46 1 800
Avertable number of cancer cases 2 5 180
Costs (M €) 5.5 16 5 100
Roofs and walls are washed using a brush and hosed with tap water. Lift • 
frames and lorries are available.
Grass is cut predominately by residents using small lawn mowers equipped • 
with collectors. The grass is put into refuse sacks, the collection of which, 
and the waste disposal, are organized by the local officers.
Trees and bushes are pruned or cut mainly by light machinery, collected, • 
chipped and disposed of. The work is organized by the local officers in coop-
eration with the local residents.
Streets are vacuum swept by equipment locally available. Dust and sand • 
are collected by lorries and disposed of preferably in surface trenches 
together with other waste.
Scraping of the turf (5 cm) is done by a digger and assisted by a front loader and • 
a lorry. It is assumed that the removed soil is replaced and the yards replanted. 
An avertable effective dose of 50 mSv in a week is used as the planning criteria for 
evacuation in Finland. Permanent resettlement of the population is recommended 
if the avertable lifetime dose is 1 000 mSv (IAEA 1994, ICRP 1993). On the 
grounds of these intervention levels, permanent resettlement in Area NPP is 
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Table IX. Consequence assessment of clean-up actions in Area 1.
Washing 
roofs
Washing 
walls
Vacuum 
sweeping 
streets
Grass 
cutting
Pruning 
vegetat.
Scraping 
topsoil
Average avertable 
dose (mSv)
11 10 8 27 2 120
Avertable collective 
dose (manSv)
90 84 70 230 17 1 030
Avertable number 
of cancer cases
9 8 7 23 2 103
Costs (M €), 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.7
Worker dose (manSv) 0 0 0 0 0 1
Waste (1 000 kg) 3 080 4 300 96 14 1 108 000
Working days 1 300 590 36 540 960 4 300
justified and continuing the evacuation of Loviisa town for one or three weeks 
could be considered due to the high iodine fallout. These are, in addition to clean-up 
actions, the alternatives that the participants of the workshop could choose from. 
Tables VII – XII give an assessment of the tangible consequences of the 
actions within each area. A wide range of strategies can be defined and assessed 
by using the information given in these tables. For example, the evacuation of the 
population in Area 1 could be prolonged for another week, the roofs and walls of 
their houses could be cleaned, the contaminated grass removed from their yards 
and some trees felled in front of their houses; similar clean-up actions could be 
implemented in Area 2, and grass cutting and street cleaning in Areas 3 and 4. An 
assessment of the consequences of such a strategy is easily made with the data 
of Tables VII – XII.
The workers’ dose is estimated by considering the time in which each action 
should be completed. It is assumed that sweeping of streets, washing of houses and 
cutting of grass should and could be done in one week, pruning of the vegetation in 
two weeks and scraping the topsoil in three weeks. In addition to the dose caused 
by the clean-up action itself, i.e. the dose received outdoors, the dose caused by 
transportation and waste disposal is roughly estimated by using the MATERIA 
and MicroShield software (Markkanen 1995, MicroShield 1996). Certain work 
stages, such as driving a full load with machinery and especially disposing onto 
an open waste trench, might cause doses which exceed the dose limits for workers. 
For example, it is estimated that the 137Cs activity in 1 m3 of vacuum swept waste 
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Table XI. Consequence assessment of clean-up actions in Area 3.
Washing 
roofs
Washing 
walls
Vacuum 
sweeping 
streets
Grass 
cutting
Pruning 
vegetat.
Scraping 
topsoil
Average avertable 
dose (mSv)
0 0 0 1 0 1
Avertable collective 
dose (manSv)
4 4 2 23 4 32
Avertable number 
of cancer cases
0 0 0 0 0 3
Costs (M €), 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.9 8
Worker dose (manSv) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Waste (1 000 kg) 13 900 17 800 450 66 5 497 000
Working days 5 700 2 450 168 2 490 4 400 19 900
Table X. Consequence assessment of clean-up actions in Area 2.
Washing 
roofs
Washing 
walls
Vacuum 
sweeping 
streets
Grass 
cutting
Pruning 
vegetat.
Scraping 
topsoil
Average avertable 
dose (mSv)
4 4 2 9 1 42
Avertable collective 
dose (manSv)
24 23 14 56 4 250
Avertable number 
of cancer cases
2 2 1 6 0 25
Costs (M €), 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 1.8
Worker dose (manSv) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Waste (1 000 kg) 3 200 4 000 103 15 1 113 000
Working days 1 300 550 39 560 990 4 500
could be 10 000 000 kBq and it alone cause the dose of 0.1 – 0.2 mSv in an hour 
and 1 – 2 mSv in a day to a driver of machinery in the town of Loviisa. The costs of 
evacuation and permanent resettlement were assessed applying methods presented 
in the COCO model (Haywood et al. 1991) and the RODOS system (Ehrhardt and 
Weis 2000; Hasemann 2000).
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Table XII. Consequence assessment of clean-up actions in Area 4.
Vacuum sweeping 
streets
Grass cutting
Average avertable dose (mSv) 0 0
Avertable collective dose (manSv) 10 110
Avertable number of cancer cases 1 11
Costs (M €) 1.2 8.1
Worker dose (manSv) 0 0
Waste (1 000 kg) 7 000 1 070
Working days 2 600 40 000
The intervention measures could entail also non-radiological risks to the 
population and the workers caused by various kinds of accidents, for example, 
during washing roofs, cutting grass and felling trees. The risks that are directly 
associated with remedial actions are estimated using Finnish statistics (Central 
Statistical Office of Finland 2003). The Statistical Yearbook, however, does not 
directly give the accident statistic for clean-up actions considered here and therefore 
the risk is estimated using accident risks in transportation, construction and 
forestry. The accident rate is not significant; if all the clean-up actions are taken in 
Loviisa town, one statistical accident might happen. However, if houses are washed 
in the Helsinki metropolitan area, circa 20 accidents might happen. 
Strategy selection for further evaluation
Before the workshop eight tentative strategies were defined and their tangible 
attributes assessed. The strategies are presented as combinations of different 
countermeasures to show in detail the different actions in each strategy and 
also to show how new strategies could be defined during the workshop (Tables 
XIII – XIV). 
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Table XIII. Tentative definition of strategies (see also colour codes in Figure 3).
Strategy
Clean-up action max A B C D E min 0
Permanent resettlement L
Evacuation, days 7 – 30 L L L L
Evacuation, days 7 – 14 L
Washing of houses L++ L++ L++ L+ L L
Sweeping of streets H H H L++ L+ L L
Pruning of vegetation L++ L++ L++ L+ L L
Cutting grass H H L++ L++ L+ L L
Scraping of topsoil L++ L+ L+ L L
L comprise Loviisa and eastern part of Pernaja;
L+ comprise in addition to L: Liljendal, Lapinjärvi and southern part of Ruotsinpyhtää;
L++ comprise in addition to  L+: western part of Pernaja, Myrskylä, Askola, Pukkila, Pornainen 
and Mäntsälä;
H comprise in addition to L++: Artjärvi, Orimattila, Kärkölä, Hausjärvi, Riihimäki, Hyvinkää, Porvoo, Sipoo, 
Järvenpää, Kerava, Tuusula, Nurmijärvi, Vantaa, Espoo, Kauniainen and Helsinki. 
Notes:
• Area NPP will be resettled in every strategy.
• Grass will not be cut in areas where surface soil will be scraped.
• In Strategy max no cleaning actions will be carried out in area L.
Table XIV. Health consequences and costs of the strategies.
Strategy
Attributes max A B C D E min 0
Cancer incidents 36 83 94 114 120 210 231 261
Saved cancer incidents 225 178 167 147 141 51 30 0
Costs of clean-up actions (M €) 22 17 9 4 2 1 0 0
Costs of relocation (M €) 5 100 16 16 16 16 6 0 0
Overall costs (M €) 5 122 33 25 20 19 6 0 0
Note. The actions taken during the first week are not included in the numbers.
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Figure 5. Tentative value tree.
 
Tentative value tree
The value tree of Figure 5 is provided as a discussion basis. 
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